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Purpose – This paper aims to advance buyer-supplier relationship management 
research by integrating transaction cost economics, social exchange theory, and 
institutional theory. The specific purpose is to identify the determinants of relational 
adaptation in the service relationship.  
Design/methodology/approach – This study used a field survey to collect data. It 
used structural equation modeling for data analyses. It collected data from the 
population of supplier organizations of a focal firm, which is an international container 
port terminal operator.  
Findings – We find that that transaction specific investment, business uncertainty, 
trust, and social respect are positively related to a supplier’s relational adaptation. 
Research limitations/implications – this research provides a synthesis of effects of 
exchange hazards, relational norms, and legitimacy to explain a supplier’s adaptation 
behaviors.  
Practical implications – Our study has several managerial implications that are 
helpful for firms to elicit adaptation from their partner firms. First, specific investment 
can be useful to serve as an interfirm governance mechanism to attain relational 
adaptation. Second, the development of trust and social respect in customer 
relationship is important for firms to attain relational adaptation.  
Originality/value – The novelty of this paper lies in an integrative synthesis of 
transaction cost economics, social exchange theory, and institutional theory. Based 
on three different mechanisms, we provide a holistic explanation for relational 
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The need for developing collaborative interorganizational relationship for 
performance enhancement has been widely recognized in the marketing literature for 
decades (Anderson and Coughlan, 2002). Research on interorganizational 
relationships has also shifted from a transaction-based to a relation-based paradigm 
(Morgan and Hunt, 1994). This relation-based approach is premised upon inter-firm 
relational adaptation (Hallen, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed, 1991), which requires 
organizational modifications to cater for the specific needs of the exchange party in 
managing buyer-supplier relationship (BSR) (Brennan, Turnull, and Wilson, 2003). 
One important goal for a BSR to pursue is improved ability to satisfy the fast-evolving 
market requirements. Achieving such goal requires adaptation by the exchange 
parties to maintain organizational flexibility in responding to the volatile market 
changes. Notwithstanding its well-recognized importance in both research and 
practice, several aspects of relational adaptation in BSR are neglected in the 
literature.  
First, the issue on relational adaptation has been given inadequate research 
attention in spite of its essential role in shaping and governing the management of 
BSR (Brennan, Turnbull, and Wilson, 2003). The urgency for investigating this 
research topic is echoed by Woo and Ennew (2004), and they indicate that “little is 
known about the process of adaptation or the motivation for adaptation” (p. 1258). 
The antecedents of relational adaptation and the mechanisms under which firms 
undertake adaptations in BSR have yet to be addressed through theoretical grinding 
and empirical investigation.  
Second, the literature on adaptive behaviors in BSR has neglected some 
important theoretical accounts. Previous studies have focused on examining dyadic 
adaptive behavior from the social exchange theory (SET) perspective (Hallen, 
Johanson, and Syed-Mohamed, 1991), arguing that organizational adaptations are 
embedded in the dyadic social exchange process. However, according to the logic of 
transaction cost economics (TCE), adaptation is fundamentally a consequence of 
uncertainty, whereby relational adaptation is a preferred governance mechanism in 
view of unforeseen contingencies in business operations (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997; Williamson, 1985). Unequivocally, there is a serious lack of research attention 
examining the antecedents and consequences of relational adaptation within the 
TCE framework (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). One plausible reason for this 
unattended but important research area is the absence of a clear and commonly 
accepted definition of relational adaptation, though the concept has been applied 
extensively in the BSR literature (Brenan, Turnbull, and Wilson, 2003). For instance, 
Brennan and Turnbull (1999) emphasize the behavioral dimension of organizational 
adaptation. Hallen, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed (1991) view interfirm adaptation 
as elements in a social exchange process. Woo and Ennew (2004) conceptualize 
adaptation as one of the dimensions underlying relationship quality. More importantly, 
the literature seems to have overemphasized the relationship-specific investment 
feature of organizational adaption (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000; Cannon 
and Perreault, 1999), neglecting its behavioral feature. In TCE, relational adaptation 
is generally considered as an exogenous preexisting transaction condition, namely, a 
relationship-specific investment (Cannon and Perreault, 1999). It is the presence of 
opportunism and the bound rationality of the involved parties that give rise to 
governance concerns in economic exchange (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000). 
As management of a BSR involves ongoing behavioral adjustment during the 
exchange process, relational adaptation is determined by the transaction conditions 










































factor. Our understanding of channel members’ adaptive behaviors can be enhanced 
through the theoretical lens of the TCE. With this consideration, we draw on both the 
TCE and SET theoretical perspectives to examine the antecedents of relational 
adaptation in managing BSR.  
Third, we extend the knowledge on channel members’ relational adaptation in 
a larger social context, i.e., in the institutional environment (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 
2002) beyond the unit of analysis of individual transactions or dyadic relations as 
espoused in TCE and SET, respectively. In the marketing channel research, there is 
a predominant focus on individual transactions or dyads to investigate the 
management of BSR (Wathne and Heide, 2004). It is possible that extensive 
noneconomic motivations and mechanisms exist behind behaviors of channel 
members. This institutional theory (INT) perspective demands understanding of 
relational adaptation beyond individual economic optimization and dyadic 
interactions, leading us to incorporate sociopolitical considerations in our analytical 
framework.  
Premised upon these three theoretical aspects (i.e., TCE, SET and INT), we 
develop a conceptual framework (see Figure 1) that integrates the effect of the 
economic, social, and legitimate factors on relational adaptation in BSR. We first 
elucidate three mechanisms underlying relational adaptation from the three 
aforementioned theoretical perspectives. Then, we establish the conceptual 
framework and develop hypotheses. Next, we explain the research setting and the 
methodology employed to collect empirical data, followed by hypothesis testing. We 
conclude with a discussion on the theoretical and managerial implications of the 
study results on the management of BSR.   
The empirical locale of this study involves a population of suppliers serving a 
major global container terminal operator based in Hong Kong. This sampling 
population serves as a rich context to test our conceptual framework as the Chinese 
society is characterized by a long history to value both social relations and legitimacy 
in business operations.  
 Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
Explaining Relational Adaptation: Three Mechanisms 
In this study, we examine the relational adaptation by suppliers in a BSR as 
the analytic focus to explain how a channel member’s adaptive behaviors can be 
shaped by the transaction conditions, social exchange process, and institutional 
legitimacy. We organize our theoretical discussions in terms of three distinct but 
reinforcing mechanisms that enhance relational adaptive behaviors in BSR and they 
include: 1) minimizing transaction costs by limiting exchange hazards, 2) building 
relationship in social exchange processes, and 3) legitimizing behaviors under 
institutional environments. The BSR literature has recognized the importance of 
economic and social forces in researching interorganizational relational behaviors 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997; Morgan and Hunt, 1994), but the combined effect of 
economic and social factors in determining adaptive behaviors remains under-
explored. An extension of this line of research to incorporate the perspective of INT 
will enrich our understanding of relational behavior to a wider macro institutional 
setting. The central goal of this article is to gain a holistic and integral understanding 
of the mechanisms that influence the adaptive behaviors of channel partners.  










































Economic activities incur transaction costs and the existence of firms is to 
minimize these costs (Williamson, 1996). Marketing channels scholars have 
dedicated extensive research effort to understand the design of interfirm governance 
mechanisms (i.e., interorganizational structures and behavior modes) that promote 
coordination with the hope to deter conflict, punitive actions, and opportunistic 
behaviors. Many channel relationships combine both “market” and “hierarchy” 
elements and they are established in hybrid form (Williamson, 1991). Rindfleisch and 
Heide (1997) have conceptualized hybrid governance as “unilateral” (contractual 
authority) and “bilateral” (relational governance) mechanisms in economic exchange. 
In this study, we view relational adaption as a dimension of bilateral (relational) 
governance, where firms adjust their actions in response to the change of channel 
partners’ request.  
Exchange hazards are the vulnerabilities encountered by firms when they 
coordinate the economic transactions as a result of bounded rationality and potential 
opportunism (cf. Williamson, 1996, p. 12). According to the logic of TCE, self-interest 
seeking parties compare the cost and efficiency of alternative governance 
mechanisms, and as exchange hazards become increasingly severe and manifest, 
they employ relational governance to constrain probable opportunistic behaviors by 
their channel partners (Heide and John, 1990). For simple exchanges (i.e., those 
encountering low level of exchange hazards), relational governance is unnecessary 
because the invisible hand of market competition regulates simple transactions 
(Williamson, 1985). The use of specific contingent contracts to specify monitoring 
techniques, penalties for non-compliance, and formal rules and processes 
(Stinchcombe, 1985) also provides adequate safeguards for slightly more complex 
economic exchanges. In case of vehement exchange hazards with rampant 
opportunistic behaviors in the BSR, the involved parties will either vertically integrate 
or design relational governance to safeguard their investment in the exchange 
(Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990; Heide and Stump, 1995). Thus, this logic 
suggests a positive association between exchange hazards and relational 
governance: the greater extent for a firm exposed to potential exchange hazards, the 
more likely that relational governance will be employed by the firm to attenuate those 
exchange hazards (Anderson and Weitz, 1992; Heide and John, 1990; Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000; Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990).  
Scholars have uncovered three primary hazards to the conduct of economic 
exchange: transaction specific investment, behavioral uncertainty, and environmental 
uncertainty (Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). In BSR, the transaction specific 
investment by suppliers and the environmental uncertainty encountered by them will 
influence their relational adaptation in the BSR, as the specific investment will render 
supplier vulnerable to the opportunistic behaviors by the buyer firms (Lai, 2009). On 
the other hand, the presence of uncertainty is a major factor affecting the 
organization and governance of exchange when combined with organizational 
interdependence in a BSR (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000). Relational 
adaptation, as a viable mean for establishing bilateral governance, can function as a 
mechanism to circumvent exchange hazards and safeguard opportunism in the BSR.  
Relational Norms in Social Exchange 
  There is growing trend in the marketing channel literature to assess and 
compare relationship management from a sociological perspective. While TCE takes 
the economic value as its centre of analysis, SET ascertains that the value of a 
channel relationship is characterized by each party’s satisfaction with the exchange, 










































and the emotional costs and benefits from alternative options (Gassenheimer, 
Houston, and Davis, 1998). SET suggests that each party of channel relationship can 
achieve their comparable and mutual long-range goals by looking beyond short-term 
and economic-driven self interests (Ouchi, 1980).  
Another fundamental difference between TCE and SET in explaining the 
channel relationship is that the former mainly investigates how initial exchange 
conditions (i.e., exchange hazards and power distribution) influence the choice of 
governance mechanisms, while the latter argues that the governance arrangements 
emerge from both pre-existing social contacts and ongoing interactions between 
partners in the social network (Macaulay, 1963; Ring and Van De Ven, 1994). 
Following this logic, adaptation is an element of a social exchange process (Brennan, 
Turnbull, and Wilson, 2003; Hallen, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed, 1991). Thus, 
the relational features of BSR, such as trust and reciprocal commitment, shape the 
development and effectiveness of a firm’s relational adaptive behaviors.  
Essential to the SET perspective of relationship management is the premise 
that social or relational norms help to bring order and stability into the social system 
and govern BSR (Heide and John, 1990). Relational norms also define expected 
behaviors of each BSR party (Cannon, Achrol, and Gundlach, 2000; Rokkan, Heide, 
and Wathne, 2003), therefore, a supplier can expect that its adaptive behavior will 
result in a commensurate return, leading to long-term cooperation and reciprocated 
by its counterpart in the relationship. Prior BSR research has identified several 
relational norms that govern exchange relationships (Macneil, 1980; Rokkan, Heide, 
and Wathne, 2003), we focus on trust and relational reciprocity in this study, which 
play pivotal role in shaping the structure and governance mechanism of exchange 
relationship (Sheng et al., 2006; Uzzi, 1996).  
Legitimacy in Institutional Environment 
INT has its roots in both economics and sociology (Scott, 1995) where the 
former focuses on the regulating role of institutions on economic activities (North, 
1990) and the latter centers on the legitimacy-defining role of institutions (Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991). While TCE focuses on the transaction and SET uses dyadic 
relationship as the unit of analysis, INT situates the interorganizational behaviors in a 
complex institutional context—consisting of rules, norms, values, and roles enforced 
through legal or social forces (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). It follows that a firm’s 
behavior is embedded within a sociopolitical network and there are extensive 
noneconomic motivations underlying the activities of firms (McFarland, Bloodgood, 
and Payan, 2008).  However, as Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002, p. 82) point out, 
marketing “researchers have largely overlooked the ubiquitous influence of the 
institutional environment and how interorganizational relationships such as marketing 
channels are embedded in the larger social context.” In an attempt to broaden our 
view of interorganizational adaptations beyond the analyses of transactions and 
dyadic interactions, we supplement the TCE and SET mechanisms with an 
institutional motivation for adaptive behaviors.  
The fundamental principle of INT is legitimacy, which is defined as “a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). It reflects how well a firm enacts 
and upholds social norms and values, when being judged in the wider society rather 
than in a dyadic exchange relationship. The existing literature discerns three broad 
types of legitimacy including pragmatic legitimacy, social legitimacy (referred as 










































study to examine the influence of social legitimacy, which consists of endorsement 
from legal authorities, regulators, or powerful organizations, on relational adaptation 
in BSR.  
Strategy theorists have long recognized social legitimacy as an intangible 
valuable resource that contributes to organization performance differences because it 
is rare, socially complex, and difficult for competitors to imitate (Barney, 1991). Social 
legitimacy services as a signal for firms to garner scarce capital, personnel, and 
exchange partners in the market with informational asymmetry, and thereby 
influences the survival of organizations (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). Although 
organizational theorists agree that social legitimacy is a determinant of organization 
performance, they have used related but distinct terminologies, including reputation 
(Rao, 1994; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988), legitimacy (Dacin, Oliver, and Roy, 2007; 
Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002; Suchman, 1995), and social status (Podolny, 1994; 
Stuart, 2000). In this study, we consider social respect as an important constituent of 
social legitimacy, because it reflects both the firm’s social status and reputation in a 
society, highlighting its value as a strategic resource. More importantly, a firm’s social 
respect in the society will prescribe its adaptive behaviors in the BSR.  
Overall, economic exchanges are embedded in a nexus of economic, social, 
and sociopolitical systems (Weitz and Jap, 1995). These three underlying 
mechanisms may coexist and complement one another in shaping an exchange 
partner’s behaviors. Next, we develop our theoretical arguments on the influence of 
these mechanisms on relational adaptation and formulate related hypotheses, 
specifying the conditions under which these mechanisms take effect. 
Hypotheses 
Exchange Hazards and Adaptation 
  Transaction specific investments (TSI) are those investments that have little or 
no value outside the focal exchange relationship (Williamson, 1985). Each BSR party 
can potentially and unfairly reap the benefits of the partner’s TSI dedicated to the 
exchange relationship. Thus, it creates a lock-in situation for the involved parties in 
BSR. A supplier’s TSI will bolster its adaptive behaviors in the BSR due to the need 
for safeguarding its TSI committed to the exchange relationship.  
The supplier’s TSI place itself in a vulnerable position because: (1) the 
supplier can lose the nonsalvageable portion of its asset specific investments if the 
exchange relationship is terminated prematurely; and (2) the buyer can use the 
specific investments as hostage (Williamson, 1996), which makes it difficult for the 
supplier to recoup the value of the relationship-specific investment (Jap and 
Ganesan, 2000). Thus, as the investing party, the supplier will always desire to 
lessen their vulnerability with the development of appropriate safeguards in the BSR. 
One useful way to prevent the TSI from exploitation by the opportunistic behaviors of 
the buyer firms is to seek vertical integration, which is a not viable option in many 
cases particularly when the buyer firm is dominant and on which the business of the 
supplier is dependent for survival. Another option, as suggested by Williamson 
(1996), is the use of bilateral hybrid governance structures (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997). The supplier’s relational adaptation, as a bilateral cooperative governance 
mechanism, will improve the buyer’s satisfaction and willingness to maintain the 
continuity for the BSR, thus allowing the supplier a longer time span to fully utilize the 
TSI over a long period time. Therefore, we propose that,  
H1:  The  supplier’s  transaction  specific  investment  is  positively 










































  Business uncertainty refers to unanticipated changes in circumstances 
surrounding an economic exchange (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990).  Although 
most scholars acknowledge this conceptual definition, its measurement is typically 
broad and incorporates many different types of uncertainty elements including 
unpredictability of the environment (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990), 
unpredictability of demand volume (Heide and John, 1990), unpredictability of 
technology (Heide and John, 1990), and decision-making uncertainty (Ganesan, 
1994). This study focuses on the unpredictability of the buyer’s demand and order 
requirements.  Regardless of the types of uncertainty elements, BSR parties face 
uncertainty because of insufficient information (Driskell and Goldstein, 1986) which 
makes planning and decision-making difficult particularly for the supplier side (Achrol 
and Stern, 1988).  To illustrate, in the empirical setting of this study, if information is 
not readily available regarding the terminal operator’s preferences, the supplier 
cannot accurately predict demand in terms of order size, cycle time, and volume 
requirements. That is, the supplier cannot determine exactly which items and their 
quantities to stock and to market aggressively, as well as how much total inventory is 
necessary to satisfy the terminal operator’s actual demand requirements. This 
uncertainty represents a challenging hazard for the suppliers in managing the BSR 
(Heide and John, 1990).  
  Adaptation is a primary consequence of uncertainty (Rindfleisch and Heide, 
1997, p. 31; see also Williamson, 1985) due to the following two reasons. First, as 
business uncertainty increases, it is more difficult, if not impossible, for the exchange 
parties to specify all contingencies in a contract a priori (Noordewier, John, and 
Nevin, 1990; Williamson, 1985). Therefore, adaptation from the supplier is necessary 
to maintain an efficient and long term BSR. For example, if the terminal operator in 
this research setting occasionally varies its order size and volume, the supplier will 
have to make corresponding adjustment in the transactions, because the BSR 
contract does not provide specified terms. On the other hand, high levels of business 
uncertainty increases the transaction costs of modifying contractual agreements 
(Rindfleisch and Heide, 1997). Then, it is more cost efficient for the BSR partners to 
increase relational adaptations in the presence of business uncertainty, rather than 
modifying the contract frequently (Noordewier, John, and Nevin, 1990). Overall, the 
supplier’s relational adaption serves as an efficient mechanism to ease any 
undesirable consequences due to business uncertainty (Williamson, 1985).  
H2:  Business  uncertainty  as  perceived  by  a  supplier  is  positively 
associated with its relational adaptation in the BSR. 
Relational Norms and Adaptation 
Trust exists when “one party has confidence in an exchange partner’s 
reliability and integrity” (Morgan and Hunt, 1994, p. 23). The literature has asserted 
that trust is of fundamental importance and can be a source of competitive advantage 
to firms (Barney and Hansen, 1995). Interorganizational trust acts as an important 
relational norm assuring partners’ cooperation and mitigating potential opportunistic 
behavior (Ganesan, 1994; Heide, 1994; Morgan and Hunt, 1994). In addition, trust in 
a BSR reduces channel conflict, leads to higher level of satisfaction by the involved 
parties (Anderson and Narus, 1990), and improves purchase intentions (Doney and 
Canon, 1997). When mutual interorganizational trust exists, partners in the BSR tend 
to resolve unanticipated contingencies in a mutually profitable way instead of 
behaving in an opportunistic manner (Ganesan, 1994). If the supplier has trust in the 
buyer, it will take necessary adaptive behaviors to maintain mutual benefits of both 










































Trust also contributes significantly to a partner’s commitment for a BSR 
(Moorman, Zaltman, and Deshpande, 1992; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Lai et al, 2008). 
A committed supplier behaves to maintain the BSR and is willing to sacrifice its short-
term interests to satisfy the buyer requirement in expectation for relationship 
continuity. When the BSR encounters environmental or dyadic turbulence, a 
committed supplier will then make necessary adaptation to shelter the relationship. In 
summary, supplier’s trust in the BSR will bolster its adaptive behaviors.  
H3: Trust as perceived by a supplier is positively associated with its relational 
adaptation in the BSR. 
Relational reciprocity refers to the extent to which a mutual pattern of positive 
interactions and relational behaviors are present in the BSR (Uzzi, 1996). It reflects 
the strength of relational embeddedness in the BSR (Rindfleisch and Moorman, 
2001; Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). Each BSR party may engage in 
voluntary helping behaviors (Hansen, 1999) or feel the obligation to cooperate (Uzzi, 
1999) particularly when the relationship is characterized by high level of reciprocity. 
For example, a highly reciprocal BSR will promote face-giving by the involved parties 
or unconditioned assistance if the other party faces a difficult situation. Therefore, 
reciprocity creates a mutually supportive BSR environment. If a supplier can expect 
that its goodwill reflected by adaptation behaviors will be rewarded somehow in the 
future, it is more likely to engage in adaptive behaviors. In other words, relational 
reciprocity provides an assurance that the adaptive behaviors will be converted into 
long term mutual benefits of the BSR parties. In addition, high level of relational 
reciprocity in the relationship will ease a supplier’s concern that its adaptive 
behaviors will be exploited opportunistically in the BSR as a consequence. Therefore, 
we posit that relational reciprocity in BSR will enhance relational adaptation. 
H4:  Relational  reciprocity  as  perceived  by  a  supplier  is  positively 
associated with its relational adaptations in the BSR. 
Social Respect and Adaptation 
We identify two mechanisms through which a supplier’s social respect 
emanated from the BSR will bolster its relational adaptation. First, there is a 
reinforcing mechanism between social respect and relational adaptation. In addition 
to the economic and transactional value, a supplier’s relationship with a well-
regarded buyer can elevate its social respect in the eyes of existing and other 
potential customer firms (Podolny, 1994; Rao, 1994). The social respect or social 
status is an important intangible strategic asset which serves as a signal of the 
supplier’s service quality and relationship building capability. In return, this asset will 
help the supplier develop partnership with other buyers in the industry and generate 
more sales. Recognizing these strategic values of social respect emanated from the 
cooperation by the buyer, the supplier will become more flexible to cater for the 
buyer’s request, as the former knows that endorsement by the latter will bring in 
social respect, which signals the supplier’s quality.  
Secondly, social respect can serve as a self-constraint to encourage the 
supplier’s adaptive behaviors. According to INT, social legitimacy is embedded in the 
larger societal context, including the normative institutions encompassing 
professional associations and the professions themselves (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 
2002). These normative institutions require BSR parties to embrace and comply with 
socially accepted norms and behaviors (Selznick, 1984), such as relational 
adaptation. In other words, a firm’s social respect emerges as an institutional 
pressure to encourage adaptive behaviors (McFarland, Bloodgood, and Payan, 










































voluntarily adhere to these social obligations, and engage in more adaptive 
behaviors. 
H5:  The  social  respect  emanating  from  the  BSR  as  perceived  by  a 
supplier is positively associated with its relational adaptations in the 
BSR.   
The Effect of Adaptation on Relationship Stability 
In the adaptation process, the supplier either makes substantial TSI or alters 
their normal business practices to appeal to the requirements in the BSR (Hallen, 
Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed, 1991). By their nature, these non-transferable TSI 
have little value outside a particular relationship and thus create a durable economic 
bond between the exchange parties (Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne, 2003). This 
economic bond will encourage cooperative behaviors from the exchange parties and 
lead to a long term stable relationship, because a stable relationship is of the best 
interest to both the BSR parties (Lai et al, 2005). In addition, relational adaptation is 
beneficial for satisfying the unforeseen BSR requirements, laying a foundation to 
build trust and cooperation (Brennan and Turnbull, 1999) as well as creating a social 
bond which will prescribe further relational behaviors the BSR parties. For example, 
Hallen, Johanson, and Seyed-Mohamed (1991) find that buyer and supplier’s 
adaptations are correlated with each other as part of a trust-building process. These 
reciprocal adaptations reflect as aspect of relational commitment in the BSR 
(Anderson and Weitz, 1992) encouraging mutual cooperation, which will contribute to 
a stable BSR in the long term.  
H6: Relational adaptation by a supplier is positively associated with its 
perceived stability of the BSR.  
Methodology 
Samples 
To minimize the extraneous sources of variance in BSR, we tested the above 
hypotheses by collecting data from the population of supplier organizations of a focal 
firm. This approach enabled us to minimize the potential confounding effects of 
variation in organizational practices in dealing with their partner firms. The supplier 
organizations were requested to report on their relationships with a focal buying firm 
which is an international container port terminal operator (referred as TO hereafter), 
minimizing the variation of industrial and organizational characteristics in managing 
inter-organizational relationship. This approach also allowed us to tailor the 
measurement to obtain more accurate data related to the transaction and relational 
attributes of the BSR, improving the internal validity of the survey instrument due to 
differences in industry and organizations. Following prior studies in choice of 
informants (Heide and Miner, 1992), executives of these supplier firms, identified by 
the TO, actively involved in managing the supply relations with the TO were 
surveyed. These informants were considered knowledgeable in their relationship with 
the TO and able to provide accurate evaluation of the BSR in their survey responses.   
The TO is considered as a service-oriented industrial retailing outlet that 
provides services to such organizations as shipping companies, shippers, customs, 
trucking companies, and so forth. It links the various mode of transportation (e.g., 
barge, railway and truck) to facilitate seaborne cargo movements for international 
trade. In providing logistics services such as container handling and temporary 
storage, TO requires supplier inputs ranging from ordinary office stationeries to port 
facilities such as quay cranes and their maintenance (Wong, Lai and Teo, 2009). 










































service quality.  This industrial context provides a rich research setting for examining 
the factors influencing relational adaption in BSR.  
We followed the multi-stage survey approach recommended by Dillman 
(Dillman, 2000) to enhance our response rate. The process yielded 365 responses 
with an overall response rate of 27%. However, seven returned questionnaires were 
disqualified due to significantly incomplete responses or the completed 
questionnaires were received too late for inclusion in data analysis.  
We took a number of steps to detect the problem of non-response bias. First, 
we compared the archival data on company size and age of relationship with TO for 
respondents and non-respondents. We found no significant differences between the 
two groups. In addition, we compared the responses from first- and second-wave 
mailings on the theoretical constructs, and found no significant differences between 
the two groups of respondents (Armstrong and Overton, 1977).  Thus, non-response 
bias problem appears not serious in this study.  
Measures Development  
We employed existing measures when possible and appropriate to measure 
the theoretical constructs. To measure relational adaptation (RA), we focused on the 
responding managers’ perceptions of the level of flexibility in such aspects as product 
features and inventory to meet and adapt to the requirements of TO. We used items 
dealing with managerial perceptions on the conditions of relationship in terms of 
steadiness and cooperation, and if both parties are engaged in an active and long-
term relationship to measure relationship stability (RS). We measured transaction 
specific investment (TSI) dedicated to the relationship using items evaluating the 
relationship-specific investment with committed resources and if these investments 
can be recouped. Similarly, we measured business uncertainty (BU) as an exchange 
hazard using items that reflect the level of difficulty to predict the demand and the 
order requirements by the TO.  In measuring trust (T) as a social norm, we used 
items that referred to reliability and trustworthiness of the BSR parties. The 
reciprocity (R) construct includes items evaluating the return of favor and assistance 
offered to support partners with the aim to build a long-term relationship. Last, we 
measured social respect (SR) using items that assess the degree to which respect 
and consideration were demonstrated amongst the BSR parties. We used five-point 
Likert scales to assess these theoretical constructs. Our final survey questionnaire 
was preceded by a statement instructing the respondents to refer to a major product 
or service in terms of sales volume that they supplied to TO when responding the 
survey. The measurement items and their validity assessments are summarized in 
the Appendix. 
 We consider several control variables that may affect the proposed 
relationships. A supplier has a long relationship age with TO may provide a positive 
response on their perceived relationship stability. We therefore assessed each 
supplier’s relationship age with TO in terms of the trading relationship length in 
number of years and such objective information was from the archival data provided 
by the TO. In addition, we control for unobserved power-difference effects in the 
analysis by including variables on transaction volume and supplier firm size. 
Business volume is measured in terms of total revenue generated from trading with 
the TO in the fiscal year. Lastly, supplier firm size is measured in terms of the number 
of employees. We report the basic descriptive statistics and correlations in Table 1. 
 Table 1 











































  Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1  Specific Investment  1.00                   
2  Business Uncertainty  .08  1.00                 
3  Trust  -.08  .35**  1.00               
4  Reciprocity  .17**  .21**  .32**  1.00             
5  Social Respect  .19**  .27**  .26**  .56**  1.00           
6  Relational Adaptation  .48**  .19**  .11*  .22**  .20**  1.00         
7  Relationship Stability  .11*  .27**  .47**  .38**  .39**  .15**  1.00       
8  Relationship Age  .07  .14**  .13*  -.03  .04  .03  .09  1.00     
9  Transaction Volume  .22**  .16*  .20**  .22*  .23**  .31**  .17**  .06  1.00   
10  Firm Size  .02  .16**  .08  .13*  .10  .09  .13*  .16**  .27**  1.00 
  Mean  2.57  2.64  4.17  3.41  3.07  2.04  4.16  .66  .19  .10 
  Standard deviation  .95  .88  .76  .81  .86  .98  .73  .47  .38  .30 
* p < .05;  ** p < .01 (two-tailed). 
 
Construct Validity  
We evaluated our theoretical constructs through a series of confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) models estimated with AMOS 17.0. We followed the accepted norms 
to retain only items that loaded significantly in excess of .50 (Hartline, Maxham and 
McKee, 2000). The standardized factor loadings range from .54 to .96 and are 
statistically significant at p < .01. This result provides evidence that the theoretical 
constructs possess convergent validity. The overall goodness-of-fit supports the 
seven-factor measurement model with χ
2 =893.48, df = 329, p < .001. The χ
2 / df ratio 
of 2.7 in the range of 1.50 to 3 is acceptable and it indicates a good fit (Byrne, 1989). 
The comparative fit index (CFI) was .92, the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA) was .06, and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) is .90. The scale reliabilities well 
exceeded the recommended threshold of .70 (Nunnally, 1984) in the range of  .77 to 
.94, indicating that the construct measures are sufficiently reliable. The average 
variance extracted (AVE) of each construct exceeded the recommended threshold of 
.50 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981), suggesting the measures cover at least half of the 
domain of a construct. The AVE of each construct is greater than the squared 
correlation between a pair of constructs, indicating the discriminant validity of the 
construct measures  (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Overall, these results show that the 
measures in this study possess adequate reliability and construct validity.  
Results 
The hypothesized model was tested via a structural equation model using 
AMOS 17.0. The model has acceptable fit to our survey data with χ
2 =1248.04, df = 
448, p < .001, CFI = .91, RMSEA = .06, TLI = .90. Table 2 summarizes the 
standardized parameter estimates and the results of the structural model estimation.  
Table 2 
Standardized Parameter Estimates and Summary of Results 




testing result  
H1: specific investment ￿ relational adaptation   .472 (7.76***)  Supported 
H2: business uncertainty ￿ relational adaptation  .097(1.81
+)  Supported  
H3: trust ￿ relational adaptation  .115(2.01*)  Supported 
H4: reciprocity ￿ relational adaptation  .009(.13)  Not supported  
H5: social respect ￿ relational adaptation  .123(1.81
+)  Supported 
H6: relational adaptation ￿ relationship stability  .150(2.80**)  Supported  
Controls:      










































    transaction volume  .046(.78)   
    firm size  .094(1.64
+)   
Note: Numbers in parentheses represent t-values.  
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, 
+ p < 0.10 
Exchange Hazards: H1 and H2  
We predicted that exchange hazards in terms of TSI and business uncertainty 
would be positively related to relational adaptation. We found that both the paths of 
SI￿ RA and BU ￿ RA were significant. Both H1 and H2 were supported. This 
implies that exchange hazards that characterized the vulnerability of firms in a BSR 
can drive the development of cooperation to maintain the relationship and to 
safeguard investment and reduce uncertainty in the BSR.  
Social Norms: H3 and H4 
Our prediction regarding social norms as antecedents of relational adaptation 
received mixed support. We found that trust (T) in BSR is positively related to RA, 
suggesting that where a firm believes its partners are reliable, it is more willing to 
maintain flexibility to meet its partner needs. H3 was supported. However, R ￿ RA 
was insignificant, indicating that the return of favor and voluntary cooperation 
between partners do not enhance the adaption of firms in making such changes in 
product features, personnel, distribution, and so forth. H4 was not supported. 
Social Respect: H5  
SR as an antecedent had a marginally significant influence on RA, highlighting 
the importance of paying tributes to partners for improved flexibility in the BSR. H5 
was partly supported. 
Relational Adaptation: H6 
We found that the positive RA ￿ RS path was significant. This result indicates 
that relational adaptation is valuable for establishing an enduring and stable 
relationship. Relational adaptation may indicate the willingness of the BSR parties to 
pursue relationship stability by encouraging mutual cooperation and understanding 
for reciprocal economic and operational benefits.   
Discussion 
Our research goal is to understand and to reply the call for research on the 
factors that motivate relational adaptation. The importance of relational adaptation is 
well-recognized in practice, there is little empirical evidence on how different 
transactional conditions, social exchange process, and institutional legitimacy affect 
its development, and its impact on the stability of the exchange relationship; our 
study is an attempt to fill these voids.  
The transactional conditions that are reflected in exchange hazards in terms of 
specific investment and business uncertainty are positively related to relational 
adaptation. This is consistent with prior findings that when firms perceive vulnerability 
in their economic relationship, they would maintain flexibility to better satisfy a 
partner’s requests and needs with the aim to constrain the probable opportunistic 
behavior by the partner. Specifically, our result showed that the higher level of TSI 
committed together with the higher level of difficulty in predicting the partner needs 
would require a higher level of relational adaptation through frequent modification of 
operational processes and equipments to develop a stable BSR.  
Trust, but not reciprocity, as a social norm in BSR had a significant influence 
on relational adaptation. Trust is reflected in the perception of BSR parties that the 
partner would behave cooperatively in the exchange. Consistent with the SET, social 
norm improves the flexibility of BSR parties to meet partner needs in hope of building 










































reciprocity is less important to relational adaptation. This indicates that the mutual 
dependence in BSR is insufficient to nurture relational adaptation.  
Social respect as an institutional legitimacy in BSR was positively related to 
relational adaptation. This finding is consistent with the INT that social respect forms 
the institutional base for cooperation and mutual obligations, guiding the behavior of 
partners seeking to gain legitimacy in the BSR.  
Relational adaptation is instrumental for developing relationship stability in 
BSR, where partners have a good relationship that reduces misunderstanding and 
enables a continuous relationship. With firms being adaptive to meet their partner 
needs, a harmonious and long-term oriented relationship can be induced, suggesting 
the value of relational adaptation in exchange relationship.  
Managerial Implications 
Our study has several managerial implications that are helpful for firms to elicit 
adaptation from their partner firms. First, prior studies based on the TCE perspective 
as well as our findings have shown that exchange hazards in terms of specific 
investment and business uncertainty can be instrumental to achieve relational 
adaptation in a BSR. As indicated in our findings, specific investment can be useful to 
serve as an interfirm governance mechanism to attain relational adaptation. Similarly, 
firms who are unable to predict their future exchange relationship with their buyers 
would be more adaptive to the requirements and specification. The perceived 
vulnerability due to specific investment and business uncertainty encountered by 
suppliers in the BSR increases their level of adaptability in complying with the buyers’ 
specifications. Managers of buying firms may therefore apply these governance 
mechanisms as means to attain relational adaptation from their suppliers, while the 
suppliers should consider their ability to be adaptive to buyers’ requirements when 
they make specific investment and are uncertain with future exchange relationship.  
Second, our research shows that the development of trust in BSR is important 
to firms to attain relational adaptation in a BSR. Prior studies have suggested that 
trust can reduce self-interest seeking behavior of partners. Instead, a trusting 
relationship suggests partners are likely to seek mutual interest and willing to 
sacrifice their short-term benefits. Such relational norm contributes mutual 
understanding of responsibilities and roles of partners in a BSR, eliciting adaptation 
in a BSR. Thus, the development of a trusting BSR with confidence in partners’ 
reliability and integrity can be useful for managers to attain relational adaptation for 
flexibility of partners to meet their changing requirements.  
Third, reciprocity as a social norm is found insufficient to attain relational 
adaptation. The favors and face-giving by partners does not imply their adaptation. 
Managers should not assume adaptation from partners who have shown relational 
reciprocity. Instead, the development of trust in a BSR as a social norm is more 
preferable to attain adaptation from partners.  
Fourth, our results suggest that social respect as institutional legitimacy exerts 
influence on relational adaptation. This suggests that managers should acknowledge 
that social respect perceived by suppliers can be a useful institutional mechanism to 
cultivate relational adaptation.  Managers may encourage relational adaptation by 
showing recognition and consideration to improve social status of suppliers.  
Lastly, our findings reveal a positive relationship between relational adaptation 
and relationship stability, suggesting adaptation can be useful in creating a social 
bond in a BSR that contributes to a cooperative and long-term relationship. To 
improve relationship stability, managers should acknowledge that exchange hazards 










































trust, and institutional legitimacy in terms of social respect are important catalysts for 
relational adaptation, which is useful to stabilize a BSR.  
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
Similar to other empirical research, though we have identified the key factors 
based on three seemingly disparate theoretical perspectives that contribute to 
relational adaptation, only a couple of key variables on relational adaptation were 
examined in this study. It is possible that other variables related to exchange 
hazards, social norms, and institutional legitimacy may have an impact on the extent 
of relational adaptation in a BSR. For instance, future research may consider such 
exchange arrangements as contracts and standards that may be imposed in 
managing BSR. The exchange arrangements can govern the exchange relationship 
through reducing exchange hazards and increasing the explicitness of 
responsibilities of partner firms. With our research model serving as a basis, a more 
comprehensive research model that incorporate these additional exchange variables 
can be developed for future research.  
In addition, the data of this study was generated from the suppliers of a focal 
firm. This research design aims to improve the accuracy of measures for exchange 
behavior by minimizing the extraneous sources of variance in BSR. Future research 
can improve this research design to study BSR in multiple dyadic relationships, 
examining the differences of exchange relationship in different contexts and 
industries to improve the generalizability of findings. Moreover, it is worthwhile to 
study BSR in a longitudinal basis, taking into account the dynamics of BSR and a 
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Exchange Hazards:              
Specific Investment (H1)    
Business Uncertainty (H2) 
Relational 
Adaptation 
Relational Norms:              
Trust (H3)      
Reciprocity (H4) 
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Description  Standardized 
Factor 
Loadings 
Specific Investment  
( Stump and Heide, 
1996) 
α = .82; CR = .83;  
AVE = .55 
·  We have spent significant resources to ensure the specifications for the items 
supplied to Terminal Operator fit well with Terminal Operator’s operational 
capabilities 
·  Most of the training we have undertaken to meet Terminal Operator’s requirements 
cannot be easily adapted for use by another customer 
·  It would be difficult for us to recoup investments made in Terminal Operator if we 
switched to another customer 
·  If we stopped contracting with Terminal Operator, we would waste a lot of 










(Heide and John, 
1990) 
α = .89; CR = .89 
AVE = .67 
 
·  Forecasting our sales volume to Terminal Operator is 
·  Forecasting Terminal Operator’s demand requirements for the items we supply is 
·  Forecasting Terminal Operator’s order size is  
·  Forecasting Terminal Operator’s order cycle is 






(Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Siguaw, 
Simpson and Baker, 
1998) 
α = .94; CR = .94 
AVE = .79 
·  Terminal Operator does what it says it will do 
·  Terminal Operator has a good reputation 
·  Terminal Operator has been frank in dealing with us 






(Leung and Chan 
2003) 
α = .77; CR = .80 
AVE = .81 
·  We always return a favor to Terminal Operator after they provide us with a favor 
·  Terminal Operator always returns a favor to us after we provide them with a favor 






(Leung and Chan 
2003) 
α = .92; CR = .92 
AVE = .70 
·  Social respect given by the Terminal Operator in social interaction improves our 
relationship with the Terminal Operator 
·  The Terminal Operator helps us get back our social respect for better exchange of 
relationship 
·  The practice of respect and consideration by the Terminal Operator greatly 
enhances our social respect 









(Hallen, Johanson and 
Seyed-Mohamed, 
1991; Noordewier, 
John and Nevin, 1990) 
α = .91; CR = .93 
AVE = .77 
·  We frequently change our product’s features to meet Terminal Operator’s specific 
needs 
·  We frequently change our personnel to meet Terminal Operator’s specific needs 
·  We frequently change our inventory and distribution to meet Terminal Operator’s 
specific needs 
·  We frequently change our marketing to meet Terminal Operator’s specific needs 










(Davies, Leung, Luk 
and Wong, 1995; 
Leung, Wong and 
Tam, 1995; Luo, 1997) 
α = .87; CR = .88 
AVE = .60 
·  We attempt to maintain harmony with Terminal Operator 
·  Our frequent cooperation with Terminal Operator reduces most of the business 
misunderstanding 
·  We maintain a good relationship with Terminal Operator for more business 
·  We maintain a good relationship with Terminal Operator for building up our 
reputation/image 









Notes: All the items, except as specifically indicated, use Likert scales (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly 
agree).  
α = Cronbach’s α, CR = composite reliability, AVE = average vari 
h
a
l
s
h
s
-
0
0
6
6
0
2
9
1
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
1
6
 
J
a
n
 
2
0
1
2